Where Lawfare Meets Lawsuit in the Case of
Padilla v. Yoo
Joseph Marchesano†
A strict observance of the written laws is doubtless one of the high
virtues of a good citizen, but it is not the highest. The laws of necessity, of self-preservation, of saving our country when in danger are
of higher obligation. To lose our country by a scrupulous adherence
to written law, would be to lose the law itself, with life, liberty,
property and all those who are enjoying them with us; thus absurdly
sacrificing the end to the means.1

I. INTRODUCTION
According to John Locke, a leader’s first duty is to protect the
country, not to follow the law.2 On September 12, 2001, a day after the
events of September 11, during a National Security Council meeting,
then-President George W. Bush told John Ashcroft, “Don’t ever let this
happen again.”3 The message could not have been clearer: “The President had to do what he had to do to protect the country. And the lawyers
had to find some way to make what he did legal.”4
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1. JACK GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY: LAW AND JUDGMENT INSIDE THE BUSH
ADMINISTRATION 80 (2009) (quoting Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John B. Colvin (Sept. 20,
1810) in THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 418 (Andrew A. Lipscomb ed., 1903)) (emphasis in
original).
2. Id. at 80–81.
3. Id. at 74–75 (quoting JOHN ASHCROFT, NEVER AGAIN: SECURING AMERICA AND
RESTORING JUSTICE 130 (2006)).
4. Id. at 81.
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Lawyers solve problems, however, by looking back rather than by
looking forward.5 Typically, when presented with a legal problem, an
attorney must apply the current law to the facts at hand. Indeed, even at
the early stages of legal analysis, the lawyer may have a particular theory
that he or she hopes to prove using the existing law. Yet, however
thought-out and creative a particular theory is, the lawyer, especially a
government attorney writing opinions that affect the constitutional rights
of citizens, is not permitted to misconstrue the law to fit the theory. John
Yoo, an attorney in the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) who was largely
responsible for authoring the infamous “torture memos,” misconstrued,
twisted, and bent existing law to fit an illegitimate legal theory—that the
use of harsh interrogation techniques would not constitute torture.
After the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the Executive
Branch relied on the OLC for unprecedented legal advice on how to deal
with issues of national security. Because the Executive Branch desired to
operate within the confines of the law, it called upon government attorneys to find an optimal balance between protecting the country and protecting the country’s laws. According to Senator Bob Graham, “[W]e
need excellent, aggressive lawyers who give sound, accurate legal advice
. . . that [allows] the operators [to] do their jobs quickly and aggressively
within the confines of law and regulation.”6 Because the President’s
power to act must be authorized by an act of Congress or the Constitution itself,7 a team of lawyers, dubbed the “War Council,” drafted a series
of memoranda with the goal of outlining the constitutional grounds for
President Bush’s actions in the War on Terror.8
The decision to intimately involve lawyers in national-security
strategy, however, is not without consequences, resulting in concerns
about the use of lawfare. Lawfare is defined as “the use of the law as a
weapon of war.”9 Proponents of lawfare use it to obtain moral high
ground over the enemy and to intimidate heads of state from acting out
of fear of prosecution for war crimes.10 Al-Qaeda training manuals, for
5. See id. at 133.
6. Id. at 92.
7. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 585 (1952) (holding that the President’s power to issue an executive order must originate from an act of Congress or the Constitution).
8. See John Schwartz, Judge Allows Civil Lawsuit Over Claims of Torture, N.Y. TIMES, June
13, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/14/us/politics/14yoo.html (discussing how the War
Council helped shape President Bush’s policy in the war on terrorism by authoring memoranda that
authorized the harsh treatment of detainees).
9. Brooke Goldstein & Aaron Eitan Meyer, Legal Jihad: How Islamist Lawfare Tactics are
Targeting Free Speech, 15 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 395, 395 (2009) (citing David B. Rivkin & Lee
A. Casey, Lawfare, WALL St. J. (Asia), Feb. 23, 2007, http://www.onlinewsj.com/article/
SB117220137149816987.html).
10. Id.
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instance, instruct readers that, if captured, they should file claims of torture or other abuse regardless of whether such abuse actually occurred.11
“Legal jihad” is another type of lawfare used to describe Islamist
organizations that file lawsuits in American and foreign courts with the
purpose of punishing those who engage in public discourse about radical
Islam.12 The lawsuits are often baseless—filed merely to intimidate defendants.13 For instance, the Council on American Islamic Relations sued
Cass Ballenger, a former U.S. Congressman, for reporting the group to
the CIA and FBI for allegedly raising funds for Hezbollah.14 Lawfare is
not limited to American courts. For instance, because the United Kingdom’s libel laws are plaintiff-friendly, as opposed to America’s defendant-friendly libel laws, the House of Lords established a government
panel to look into the possibility of amending its laws to make it tougher
for radical Islamic groups who bring defamation suits in Britain to intimidate writers.15
With respect to the War on Terror, lawfare creates a fear that judicially created remedies authorizing damages “would invite enemies to
use our own federal courts to obstruct the Armed Forces’ ability to act
decisively and without hesitation.”16 Because of the fear that our enemies
would use our court system against our country’s government actors,
Yoo defined torture so narrowly that the success of any prosecution or
lawsuit alleging torture was unlikely. Authors of the OLC memoranda
thus sought to find a way to circumnavigate the court system entirely. As
Yoo wrote in his book, War by Other Means: An Insider’s Account of the
War on Terror,17 he “developed an extra-judicial, ex parte assessment of
enemy combatant status followed by indefinite military detention, without notice of opportunity for a hearing of any sort. . . completely preclud[ing] judicial review of the designation.”18
The OLC memoranda and the use of lawfare formed the basis of
Jose Padilla’s recent lawsuit. Padilla, an American citizen whom Presi11. Id. at 395–96.
12. Brooke Goldstein & Aaron Eitan Meyer, How Islamist Lawfare Tactics are Targeting Free
Speech, THE COUNTER TERRORIST, Feb.–Mar. 2009, at 14, 16, available at http://www.
thecounterterroristmag.com/pdf/Goldstein.Lawfare.lores.pdf.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Alan Dershowitz & Elizabeth Samson, The Chilling Effect of “Lawfare” Litigation,
GUARDIAN (U.K.), Feb. 9, 2010, http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/libertycentral/2010/
feb/09/libel-reform-radical-islamic-groups.
16. In re Iraq & Afg. Detainees Litig., 479 F. Supp. 2d 85, 105 (D.D.C. 2007).
17. JOHN YOO, WAR BY OTHER MEANS: AN INSIDER’S ACCOUNT OF THE WAR ON TERROR
(2006).
18. Padilla v. Yoo, 633 F. Supp. 2d 1005, 1014–15 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (citing Plaintiff’s First
Amended Complaint ¶ 36).
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dent Bush designated an enemy combatant19 in 2002, sued John Yoo20
for the alleged abuse he suffered as a result of the memos Yoo authored.21 Notably, Padilla’s capture was the impetus for two memoranda
written by Yoo. The suit posed a question originally addressed by our
Founding Fathers, which was how to balance fighting a war against terror—at home and abroad—with fighting a war using tactics of terror.22
Determining the proper role of the Judiciary in such an inquiry presents
another complicated legal question—is it proper to exclude the Judiciary
from national-security issues due to the fear that enemy combatants will
use the courts against the Executive Branch? While courts should defer
to the coordinate branches of government with respect to the “core strategic matters of war making,”23 the Supreme Court has clearly held that a
“state of war is not a blank check for the President when it comes to the
rights of the Nation’s citizens.”24
This Note argues that, despite the concern that the use of lawfare
threatens American national-security interests, Padilla v. Yoo was decided correctly, both in its legal reasoning and in the appropriateness of
the Judiciary’s intervention in a domestic question of constitutional
rights. Part II examines Padilla’s capture and detention, as well as the
development of the torture memos. Part III discusses the constitutional
violations alleged in Padilla. Part IV suggests that, despite the use of
lawfare, the Judiciary properly adjudicated a domestic-affairs issue and
acted within its authority in not deferring to the coordinate branches of
government. Part V analyzes the trial court’s reasoning in denying Yoo’s
qualified-immunity defense. Finally, Part VI summarizes the balance
government lawyers seek to achieve and the integral role of the Judiciary
in that process.

19. An enemy combatant is “[a] combatant captured and detained while serving in a hostile
force during open warfare.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009).
20. Elaine Cassel, Jose Padilla’s Suit Against John Yoo: An Interesting Idea, But Will It Get
Far?, FINDLAW, Jan. 14, 2008, http://writ.corporate.findlaw.com/cassel/20080114.html. Attorneys
working with the Lowenstein International Human Rights Clinic at Yale Law School filed the civil
action on behalf of Padilla against John Yoo. Id. Ironically, Yoo is a Yale Law School graduate. Id.
21. Padilla, 633 F. Supp. 2d at 1012.
22. Id.
23. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 535 (2004) (“While we accord the greatest respect and
consideration to the judgments of military authorities in matters relating to the actual prosecution of
war, and recognize that the scope of that discretion necessarily is wide, it does not infringe on the
core role of the military for the courts to exercise their own time-honored and constitutionally mandated roles of reviewing and resolving claims like those presented here.”).
24. Id. at 536.
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II. THE CONFLUENCE OF THE TORTURE MEMOS AND THE CAPTURE
AND DETENTION OF JOSE PADILLA
After Padilla was imprisoned as an enemy combatant, government
officials attempted to find constitutional validity for harsh interrogation
methods. Padilla remained in solitary confinement for three years with
no charges filed against him; however, in 2005, criminal charges were
suddenly filed.25 On August 16, 2007, a jury convicted Padilla and two
codefendants of conspiracy to murder, kidnap, and maim people in a foreign country,26 conspiracy to provide material support for terrorists, and
providing material support for terrorists.27 On January 22, 2008, Padilla
was sentenced to seventeen years and four months28 in the Federal Maximum Security Prison in Florence, Colorado.29 This Part discusses the
circumstances of Padilla’s capture, the conditions of his confinement
prior to his civil suit against Yoo, and the development of the torture
memos, which as noted above were drafted in part based on Padilla.
A. “This guy Padilla’s a bad guy.”30
Jose Padilla, later known as Abdullah al-Muhajr, was born in
Brooklyn and raised with his four siblings in Chicago, where he began
drinking and flashing gang symbols in his early teens.31 When he was
25. Times Topics: Jose Padilla, N.Y. TIMES, http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/
timestopics/people/p/jose_padilla/index.html?scp=1-spot&sq=jose%20padilla&st=cse (last modified
Mar. 6, 2009).
26. See Jeff St. Onge, Appeals Court Renews Charge Against Padilla, N.Y. SUN, Jan. 31, 2007,
http://www.nysun.com/national/appeals-court-renews-charge-against-padilla/47699/. District Court
Judge Marcia Cooke in Miami dismissed the charge of conspiracy to murder, kidnap, and maim
because it charged Padilla twice for the same conduct. Id. The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit, however, reinstated the charge. Id.
27. Id.
28. Associated Press, Jose Padilla Sentenced on Terrorism Charges, MSNBC, Jan. 22, 2008,
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/22784470/.
29. Kiely Lewandowski, Padilla Sent to Colorado “Supermax” Prison to Serve Out Terrorism
Conspiracy Sentence, JURIST, Apr. 19, 2008, http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/paperchase/2008/04/padillasent-to-colorado-supermax.php. See also Peter A. Talevich, Note, During and in Relation to: How
the Ninth Circuit Rewrote a Statute in the Case of the Millennium Bomber, 32 SEATTLE U. L. REV.
477, 481 n.29 (2009) (citing Marianne Vollers, Inside Bomber Row, TIME, Nov. 5, 2006, at 36–40,
available at http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1555145,00.html) (“The inmate list
of ADX Florence, as it is known, is a veritable ‘who’s who’ of terrorists involved in attacks against
American interests.”). In addition to Padilla, the prison also holds Unabomber Ted Kaczynski; Oklahoma City Federal Building accomplice Terry Nichols; the mastermind of the first attack on the
World Trade Center, Ramzi Yousef; al-Qaeda shoe bomber Richard Reid; and September 11 conspirator Zacharias Moussaui. Id.
30. Deborah Sontag, Terror Suspect’s Path From Streets to Brig, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25, 2004,
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/04/25/us/terror-suspect-s-path-from-streets-tobrig.html?pagewanted=
all (quoting President Bush as saying “‘this guy Padilla’s a bad guy’”). This Part draws extensively
from Sontag’s article.
31. Id.
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fourteen, Padilla and a friend were drinking on a street corner and decided to rob a couple of Mexican immigrants.32 Padilla’s friend stabbed
one of the immigrants to death, and Padilla kicked him in the head “because he felt like it.”33 Padilla spent five years in a juvenile detention
center.34
In 1991, when he was twenty, Padilla got into a traffic dispute when
he cut off and flashed a revolver at another driver.35 The other driver attempted to follow Padilla, and Padilla fired a single shot into the air.36
Padilla was charged with three felony counts and sent to jail.37 A few
months into his sentence, Padilla was charged with battery on a law enforcement officer after he struck a prison guard.38
At some point during this incarceration, Padilla decided to change
his life. He began fasting and working out, and he read the Bible cover to
cover.39
Once released, Padilla worked at a Taco Bell and befriended the
restaurant manager, Muhammed Javed, who was a cofounder of the
Broward School of Islamic Studies.40 After visiting a mosque with Javed,
Padilla began studying Arabic and scripture.41 Padilla decided that he
wanted to immerse himself in the Arabic language and in Islam, so he
moved to Egypt.42 He worked days teaching English at a private school
and nights as a gym trainer and martial arts instructor.43 After returning
from the Hajj,44 Padilla took a job teaching English in Yemen.45
B. “[T]he hunt was on. . . .”46
During the spring of 2002, Abu Zubaydah, a senior al-Qaeda official under American custody at an undisclosed location overseas, told
interrogators that al-Qaeda members had come to him with a proposal to

32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. The Hajj is the religious pilgrimage to Mecca. Times Topics: Hajj, N.Y. TIMES, http://topics
.nytimes.com/topics/reference/timestopics/subjects/i/islam/hajj/index.html?scp=1-spot&sq=hajj&st=
cse (last visited April 6, 2011).
45. Sontag, supra note 30.
46. Id.
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acquire and detonate a radiological device, a so-called dirty bomb.47 Zubaydah identified Padilla as part of the dirty bomb plot.48 On May 8,
2002, Padilla checked in at the Zurich airport for a flight to Chicago.49
Unbeknown to Padilla, Swiss and American intelligence agents also
boarded the plane.50 Once Padilla landed at O’Hare, FBI agents arrested
him based on a material witness warrant.51 American intelligence officials told reporters that the dirty bomb plot was in the early stages and a
time for the detonation had not been set.52 Intelligence officials noted
that, because of Padilla’s American citizenship, al-Qaeda leadership
thought he would have an easier time accessing the United States to carry
out the dirty bomb plot.53
After his arrest, officials sent Padilla to the Metropolitan Corrections Center in downtown Manhattan.54 On June 9, 2002, while a motion
was pending to vacate the material witness warrant, then-President
George W. Bush, consistent with the advice from Yoo in the “Determination of Enemy Belligerency and Military Detention” memo, issued an
order that declared Padilla an enemy combatant and directed Secretary of
Defense Donald Rumsfeld to take Padilla into protective military custody.55 At the time, so long as Padilla was held under military authority, he
could be detained indefinitely.56 According to the President, Padilla was
associated with al-Qaeda, was engaged in conduct that constituted hostile
and war-like acts, and represented a “continuing, present and grave danger to the national security of the United States”; thus, Padilla’s detention
would “prevent him from aiding al-Qaeda in its efforts to attack the
United States or its armed forces, other governmental personnel, or citizens.”57
Although Padilla’s arrest was viewed as an antiterrorism victory,
skeptics questioned the lack of formal criminal charges brought against

47. James Risen & Philip Shenon, Traces of Terror: The Investigation; U.S. Says It Halted
Qaeda Plot to Use Radioactive Bomb, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 2002, http://www.nytimes.com/
2002/06/11/national/11ARRE.html.
48. See Sontag, supra note 30. Zubaydah did not refer to Padilla by name; instead, he described
him physically and referred to him as a Latin-American. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. See Risen & Shenon, supra note 47.
53. See id.
54. Sontag, supra note 30.
55. See Memorandum from President George W. Bush to Sec’y of Defense Donald Rumsfeld
(June 9, 2002) [hereinafter Memorandum from President George W. Bush], reprinted in Padilla v.
Hanft, 423 F.3d 386, 389 (4th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1062 (2006).
56. See Sontag, supra note 30.
57. Memorandum from President George W. Bush, supra note 55.
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him.58 Democrats and the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) questioned whether Padilla’s arrest was part of a pattern in which the Bush
Administration orchestrated its announcements to advance the administration’s interests.59 According to an ACLU spokesperson, while the administration’s position was that it would not disclose information about
terrorist plots it disrupted, the administration did, in fact, emerge with a
new announcement each time it faced criticism.60
C. Legally Justifying Torture
Meanwhile, a little-known department of the government, tasked
with setting the outer limits of the President’s authority in a time of war,
analyzed the legal strategies the Executive Branch could take with respect to Padilla. Before the torture memos became public, neither the
authority bestowed to the OLC nor the shield the OLC provided to those
who relied on its opinions was widely known. The OLC’s power was so
great that it was “practically impossible to prosecute someone who relied
in good faith on an OLC opinion, even if the opinion turns out to be
wrong.”61 Thus, one consequence of the OLC’s power to interpret the
law was the power to give government officials a potential shield for actions taken at the edges of vague criminal laws.62 This section describes
the structure of the OLC and details the three memos that pertained to
Padilla.
1. The Office of Legal Counsel
The OLC is located within the Department of Justice and “functions
as a kind of general counsel” to the Executive Branch.63 OLC opinions

58. Adam Liptak, Traces of Terror: The Courts; Questions on U.S. Action in Bomb Case, N.Y.
TIMES, June 11, 2002, http://www.nytimes.com/2002/06/11/us/traces-of-terror-the-courts-questionson-us-action-in-bomb-case.html.
59. Neil A. Lewis, Traces of Terror: The Disclosure; Questions of Timing Arise With New
Information, N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 2002, http://www.nytimes.com/2002/06/12/us/traces-of-terrorthe-disclosures-questions-of-timing-arise-with-new-information.html.
60. Id. (quoting Laura W. Murphy, Director of the Washington office of the ACLU).
61. GOLDSMITH, supra note 1, at 96.
62. Id. at 96–97.
63. Dawn E. Johnsen, Faithfully Executing the Laws: Internal Legal Constraints on Executive
Power, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1559, 1577 (2007). Conversely, the Office of the White House Counsel is
located within the White House and has a much smaller mandate. Tung Yin, Great Minds Think
Alike: The “Torture Memo,” Office of Legal Counsel, And Sharing the Boss’s Mindset, 45
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 473, 477 (2009). Typically, instead of providing legal response to specific
inquiries, the White House Counsel monitors potential conflicts of interest within the White House,
helps to vet judicial and cabinet nominees, and advises on potential legislation. See Anthony Saul
Alperin, The Attorney–Client Privilege and the White House Counsel, 29 W. ST. U. L. REV. 199,
209–11 (2002). Lastly, the White House Counsel provides an informal channel between the Presi-
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are published as Opinions of the Attorney General.64 The OLC’s interpretations of law are typically considered binding within the Executive
Branch, unless overridden by the Attorney General or the President.65
At the time of the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, Assistant
Attorney General Jay S. Bybee headed the OLC.66 Yoo, a Deputy Attorney General, was in charge of foreign affairs and national security for the
OLC.67 Although Bybee led the OLC, Yoo authored the three memoranda that would form the subject matter of Padilla’s civil claim: two that
specifically referenced Padilla, and a third, and most controversial, that
narrowly interpreted a torture statute.68
2. The Three Memos Pertaining to Padilla
Yoo’s first memo, “Determination of Enemy Belligerency and
Military Detention,”69 concluded that Padilla qualified as an enemy combatant under the laws of armed conflict. The memo relied heavily on Ex
parte Quirin,70 a World War II-era case in which German saboteurs infiltrated New York and Chicago. In Quirin, the Supreme Court reasoned,
“[T]hose who during [a] time of war pass surreptitiously from enemy
territory into our own, discarding their uniforms upon entry, for the
commission of hostile acts involving destruction of life or property, have
the status of unlawful combatants . . . .”71 Thus, the Court explained,
“[L]awful combatants are subject to capture and detention as prisoners of
war by opposing military forces,” and “[u]nlawful combatants are likewise subject to capture and detention.”72

dent and the Attorney General. See Jeremy Rabkin, At the President’s Side: The Role of the White
House Counsel in Constitutional Policy, 56 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 63, 80–81 (1993).
64. See 28 C.F.R. § 0.25 (2009).
65. Johnsen, supra note 63, at 1577.
66. Yin, supra note 63, at 477. During 2002, President Bush appointed Bybee for a judgeship
on the Ninth Circuit. Harry Weinstein, Conservative Confirmed as 9th Circuit Judge, L.A. TIMES,
Mar. 14, 2003, http://articles.latimes.com/2003/mar/14/local/me-bybee14. Former University of
Chicago law professor Jack Goldsmith replaced Bybee atop the OLC. Yin, supra note 63, at 478.
67. Yin, supra note 63, at 477.
68. Yoo authored numerous memos while working for the OLC. For a thorough index of OLC
memoranda during the war on terror, see Index of Bush-Era OLC Memoranda Relating to Interrogation, Detention, Rendition and/or Surveillance, ACLU, Mar. 3, 2009, http://www.aclu.org/
pdfs/safefree/olcmemos_2009_0305.pdf.
69. OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, MEMORANDUM TO THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL: DETERMINATION OF ENEMY BELLIGERENCY AND MILITARY DETENTION (2002), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/documents/memomilitarydetention06082002.pdf [hereinafter
ENEMY BELLIGERENCY MEMO].
70. Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
71. ENEMY BELLIGERENCY MEMO, supra note 69, at 3 (quoting Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. at
35).
72. Id. at 2 (quoting Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. at 31).
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Yoo compared Padilla’s capture to the situation in Quirin, arguing
that Quirin allows the President, under the Commander-in-Chief power
in Article II of the U.S. Constitution, to direct the armed forces to seize
enemy combatants in an armed conflict and detain them until the end of
any armed conflict.73 Here, Padilla met with a senior al-Qaeda operative
while living abroad and discussed a plan to detonate a radiological explosive device within the United States.74 Further, like in Quirin, Padilla
entered the United States as part of a plan to conduct acts of sabotage
that could have resulted in a massive loss of life.75
The second memo naming Padilla, “Re: Applicability of 18 U.S.C.
§ 4001(a) to Military Detention of United States Citizens,”76 argued that
the transfer of Padilla from the custody of the Department of Justice to
the control of the Department of Defense violated the federal NonDetention Act.77 This statute states that “[n]o citizen shall be imprisoned
or otherwise detained by the United States except pursuant to an act of
Congress.”78 According to Yoo, this law did not apply to Padilla because
military detention of enemy combatants serves a different goal than detention of civilians.79 While the purpose of law-enforcement detention is
punitive, the exclusive purpose of military detention is to prevent the
captured individual from serving the enemy.80 Thus, the Non-Detention
Act did not, and could not, intrude upon the core presidential function of
capturing and detaining members of the enemy.81
Yoo additionally stated that the President’s authority to detain an
enemy combatant is not limited by a showing of American citizenship.82
For instance, in In re Territo, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held
that “it is immaterial to the legality of petitioner’s detention as a prisoner
of war by American military authorities whether petitioner is or is not a
citizen of the United States of America.”83
Finally, Yoo’s most controversial memo, “Standards of Conduct for
Interrogation under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A” (Torture Statute
73. Id. at 1–2.
74. Id. at 3.
75. Id.
76. OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, MEMORANDUM FOR DANIEL J.
BRYANT, RE: APPLICABILITY OF 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a) TO MILITARY DETENTION OF UNITED STATES
CITIZENS (2002), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/documents/memodetentionuscitizens
06272002.pdf [hereinafter MILITARY DETENTION MEMO].
77. Non-Detention Act, 18 U.S.C. § 4001 (1971).
78. Id. at § 4001(a) (emphasis added).
79. MILITARY DETENTION MEMO, supra note 76, at 2–3.
80. Id. at 3.
81. Id. at 2.
82. Id. at 4.
83. In re Territo, 156 F.2d 142, 144 (9th Cir. 1946).
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Memo),84 provided additional support for Padilla’s civil suit. According
to 18 U.S.C. § 2340A, it is a crime for any U.S. national to commit or
attempt to commit torture.85 Torture is defined as “an act committed by a
person acting under the color of law specifically intended to inflict severe physical or mental suffering (other than pain or suffering incidental
to lawful sanctions) upon another person within his custody or physical
control.”86 Ultimately, Yoo concluded while “certain acts may be cruel,
inhuman, or degrading,” the acts may fall outside § 2340A.87
Yoo began the Torture Statute Memo by analyzing the plain language of each element of § 2340. First, Yoo concluded that “specifically
intended” constituted a subjective element—the prosecution must prove
that the defendant acted with “specific intent” to torture.88 Thus, to act
with specific intent, “the infliction of such pain must be the defendant’s
precise objective.”89 Conversely, if the defendant possessed knowledge
that severe pain would result from his actions, but causing such harm
was not his objective, then the defendant merely possessed general intent
and did not possess the requisite mental state to violate the statute.90 Additionally, if the defendant acted “with a good faith belief that his conduct would not produce the result that the law prohibits,” the specific
intent element would be negated.91 Yoo did not define good faith; however, relying on Cheek v. United States,92 he stated that “[a] good faith
belief need not be a reasonable one.”93 While the Supreme Court did,
indeed, hold that an unreasonable good faith belief negated specific intent, Cheek involved the complex tax code and the Court’s belief that a
taxpayer should be given the benefit of the doubt.94 Arguably, because
the torture statute is not nearly as complex as the tax code, the threshold
for good faith should be different.95
Second, Yoo defined “severe pain or suffering” by considering basic rules of grammar and statutory construction. Yoo opined that “inflic84. OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, MEMORANDUM FOR ALBERTO R.
GONZALES, RE: STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR INTERROGATION UNDER 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A
(2002), available at http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB127/02.08.01.pdf [hereinafter TORTURE STATUTE MEMO]. This memorandum was signed by Bybee but generally understood to
be written by Yoo. Yin, supra note 63, at 478–79.
85. 18 U.S.C. § 2340A (2001).
86. 18 U.S.C. § 2340(1) (2004).
87. TORTURE STATUTE MEMO, supra note 84, at 1.
88. Id. at 3.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 3–4.
91. Id. at 4.
92. Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192 (1991).
93. TORTURE STATUTE MEMO, supra note 84, at 5 (citing Cheek, 498 U.S. at 202).
94. Yin, supra note 63, at 480.
95. Id.
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tion of pain or suffering per se, whether it is physical or mental, is insufficient to amount to torture.”96 Rather, to amount to torture, the pain or
suffering “must be severe.”97 Grammatically, Yoo was correct—“severe”
modifies “pain and suffering.” But Yoo interpreted this grammatical
shortcoming to set forth a standard of conduct that would allow all but
the most egregious forms of torture. Because § 2340 did not define the
term “severe pain,” Yoo relied on the common rule of statutory construction, which gives ambiguous terms the same definition found in other
statutes.98 The phrase “severe pain” appears in a statute defining an
emergency medical condition for the purpose of providing health benefits.99 This statute defines an emergency condition as one that placed the
health of the individual “(i) in serious jeopardy, (ii) serious impairment
to bodily functions, or (iii) serious dysfunction of any bodily organ or
part.”100
Although the medical statute addressed a substantially different
subject than the substance of § 2340, Yoo argued that it was “nonetheless
helpful for understanding what constitutes severe physical pain.”101 Despite the tenuous connection between the medical statute and the torture
statute, Yoo used the medical statute to define the outer limits of torture
tactics that American military and intelligence officials could use during
interrogations of detainees. He concluded that the damage to the detainee
“must rise to the level of death, organ failure, or the permanent impairment of a significant body function.”102
96. Id. at 5.
97. TORTURE STATUTE MEMO, supra note 84, at 5.
98. See West Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 100 (1991) (“[W]e construe [a
statutory term] to contain that permissible meaning which fits most logically and comfortably into
the body of both previously and subsequently enacted law.”).
99. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1369(d) (2000); 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-22(d)(3)(B) (2000).
100. 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-22(d)(3)(B) (describing that an emergency condition “manifest[s]
itself by acute symptoms of sufficient severity (including severe pain) such that a prudent layperson,
who possesses an average knowledge of health and medicine, could reasonably expect the absence
of immediate medical attention to result in—(i) placing the health of the individual . . . in serious
jeopardy, (ii) serious impairment to bodily functions, or (iii) serious dysfunction of any bodily organ
or part”).
101. TORTURE STATUTE MEMO, supra note 84, at 6.
102. Id. Yoo demonstrated even more profound levels of creativity when he determined what
would be considered the “administration . . . of mind-altering substances or other procedures calculated to disrupt profoundly the sense of personality.” 18 U.S.C. § 2340(2)(B) (2004). For procedures
using drugs to rise to the level of “disrupt[ing] profoundly the senses or personality,” “they must
produce an ‘extreme effect.’” TORTURE STATUTE MEMO, supra note 84, at 6. For example, druginduced dementia, which would cause significant memory impairment, such as the inability to retain
any new information or recall information about things previously of interest to the individual, is
considered a profound disruption. Id. at 1. Similarly, the onset of a “brief psychotic disorder” would
satisfy the standard. Id. at 11. The onset of an obsessive–compulsive disorder would rise to the “profound disruption” standard if there were “aggressive or horrific impulses.” Id. Lastly, Yoo noted that
pushing someone to the “brink of suicide” would be a sufficient disruption of the personality to
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Finally, Yoo considered the applicability of § 2340A in relation to
the President’s constitutional powers. According to Yoo, § 2340A does
not apply to the President’s detention and interrogation of enemy combatants.103 Yoo’s reasoning was synonymous with the fear of lawfare: if
executive officials were subject to prosecution for conducting interrogations while carrying out the President’s Commander-in-Chief power, “it
would significantly burden and immeasurably impair the President’s
ability to fulfill his constitutional duties.”104 Thus, in order to respect the
President’s inherent constitutional authority to manage a military campaign against al-Qaeda and its allies, § 2340A must be construed as inapplicable to interrogations undertaken pursuant to the Commander-inChief authority.105
III. LAWFARE AND LAWSUITS: PADILLA V. YOO
On June 9, 2002, Department of Defense officials took Padilla into
custody without charging him and transported him to the Consolidated
Naval Brig in Charleston, South Carolina.106 In an empty wing of the
military brig, the officials placed Padilla in a tiny cell where
Padilla alleges that he was “subjected to a systematic program of
unlawful interrogation methods and conditions of confinement,
which proximately and foreseeably caused [him] to suffer extreme
isolation, sensory deprivation, severe physical pain, sleep deprivation, and profound disruption of his senses, all well beyond the
physical and mental discomfort that normally accompanies incarceration.”107

According to Padilla, Yoo personally provided numerous legal
memoranda that purported to provide government agents a legal basis to
implement an extreme and unprecedented interrogation and detention
program—even though such tactics were unprecedented in U.S. history
and clearly contrary to the U.S. Constitution and the law of war. Based
on the series of memoranda authored by Yoo, Padilla alleged that Yoo
proximately and foreseeably injured him by violating numerous clearly
established constitutional and statutory rights: (1) denial of access to

constitute a “profound disruption.” Id. Although Yoo listed four examples of what would likely be
considered a “profound disruption,” he did not give examples of what would not reach that standard
of treatment thus signaling that actions falling outside his enumerated examples would fall beyond
the statute. See id.
103. TORTURE STATUTE MEMO, supra note 84, at 35.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 34.
106. Padilla v. Yoo, 633 F. Supp. 2d 1005, 1013 (N.D. Cal. 2009).
107. Id. (quoting Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint ¶ 45).
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counsel, (2) denial of access to court, (3) unconstitutional conditions of
confinement, (4) unconstitutional interrogations, (5) denial of freedom of
religion, (6) denial of the right of information, (7) denial of the right to
association, (8) unconstitutional military detention, (9) denial of the right
to be free from unreasonable seizures, and (10) denial of due process.108
Padilla’s complaint also contained an exhaustive list of twenty-five
specific types of interrogation tactics and policies, including the following: (1) extreme and prolonged isolation; (2) deprivation of light and exposure to prolonged periods of artificial light, sometimes in excess of
twenty-four hours; (3) extreme and deliberate variations in the temperature of his cell; (4) sleep adjustment; (5) threats to subject him to physical abuse that would result in severe physical pain and suffering, or
death, including threats to cut him with a knife and pour alcohol into the
wounds; (6) threats to kill him immediately; (7) threats to transfer him to
a location outside of the United States, to a foreign country or Guantanamo, where he was told he would be subjected to far-worse treatment;
(8) administering to him or making believe that he was being administered psychotropic drugs against his will; (9) shackling and manacling
for hours at a time; (10) forcing him into markedly uncomfortable and
painful (or “stress”) positions; (11) requiring him to wear earphones and
black-out goggles during movement to, from, and within the brig; (12)
introducing into his cell noxious fumes that caused pain to the eyes and
nose; (13) lying to him about his location and the identity of his interrogators; (14) loud noises at all hours of the night, caused by government
agents banging on the walls and bars of his cell or opening and shutting
the doors to nearby empty cells; (15) withholding a mattress, pillow,
sheet or blanket, leaving him with nothing to sleep or rest on except a
cold steel slab; (16) forced grooming; (17) sudden and unexplained suspension of showers; (18) sudden and unexplained removal of religious
items; (19) constant surveillance, including during the use of toilet facilities and showers; (20) blackening out of the interior and exterior windows of his cell; (21) deprivation of access to any form of information
about the outside world, including radio, television, and newspapers from
the time of his imprisonment in the military brig until summer 2004, at
which time he was allowed very limited access to such materials; (22)
denial of sufficient exercise and recreation and, when permitted intermittently, only in a concrete cage and often at night; (23) denial of any mechanism to tell time in order to ascertain the time for prayer in keeping
with the Muslim practice; (24) denial of access to the Koran for most of

108. Id. at 1016–17.
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his detention; and (25) complete deprivation or inadequate medical care
for serious and potentially life-threatening ailments.109
Yoo filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, relying heavily on the
qualified-immunity defense; however, the court denied his motion in regard to all of Padilla’s claims.110
IV. DESPITE THE USE OF LAWFARE, THE JUDICIARY PROPERLY
INTERVENED TO RESOLVE PADILLA’S CLAIMS
When drafting his memoranda on the treatment of Padilla, Yoo articulated a strong vision of executive power. The vision was designed, in
part, to navigate around the Judiciary, which would be susceptible to
lawfare tactics. Thus, it came as no surprise that Yoo’s defense to Padilla’s claims relied on a similar philosophy: the Judiciary should not be
involved in a dispute over the President’s constitutional authority during
an armed conflict.
A United States District Court in California, however, thought otherwise and properly rejected Yoo’s attempt to circumnavigate the Judiciary. In order to support “a government of laws, and not of men,”111 the
Judiciary cannot be sidelined when it comes to matters of national security. Thus, despite Padilla’s use of lawfare, the Judiciary was the proper
forum to adjudicate Padilla for three reasons. First, our nation is founded
upon a principle of three independent branches of government, where
each branch checks the actions of the other two. Second, although the
threat of lawfare comes primarily from foreign sources, Padilla is an
American citizen, detained on American soil, whose fate was determined
by American lawyers. Finally, the Judiciary has the power to recognize
causes of action for constitutional violations despite the absence of a statute that authorizes such a cause of action.
A. Separation of Powers and the Proper Role of the Judiciary
“The separation of governmental powers into the Legislature, Executive, and Judiciary is fundamental to our democratic government, and
under the Constitution, no one department may interfere with or encroach upon either of the other branches.”112 Lawfare tactics turn the Judiciary into a potential weapon against the other branches of government
and government employees. For instance, the threat of criminal prosecution or tort liability has the potential to chill the efforts of individual gov109. Id. at 1013–14.
110. Id. at 1039–40 (granting Padilla leave to amend his claim for a violation of his Fifth
Amendment right against compelled self-incrimination).
111. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803).
112. 16 C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 215 (2009).
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ernment actors. In the case of Padilla, by defining torture so narrowly,
Yoo sought to remove the Judiciary from the separation-of-powers equation. Government agents were free to operate under the golden shield
created by Yoo’s memos, which minimized the chance that the Judiciary
would hear a claim involving torture. The structural provisions of the
Constitution, however, prevent the accumulation of power in the hands
of a single person or group regardless of the motivation to consolidate
power.113 Thus, if any branch of government acts beyond the bounds of
the authority granted to it from the Constitution, the Judiciary, and the
Judiciary alone, may consider such action unconstitutional and void.114
Despite potential misuse of the court system through lawfare tactics, the Judiciary is the proper branch to hear torture claims because of
its unique functional position. While theoretically each branch is independent, in practice, the directive of each branch inherently changes the
power balance between the other branches. For instance, the Judiciary’s
breadth of power is limited by the jurisdiction granted to it by Article III
of the Constitution; therefore, it is the most reactive of the three
branches.115 The Executive and Legislative Branches, on the other hand,
are proactive branches of government.116 Because the Judiciary must wait
for an issue to be presented in court, it functions as both a stopgap and a
neutral arbiter that must deal with the issue before it. Without judicial
involvement, the power to make and interpret law would be left to the
Legislative and the Executive Branches—and the motive to avoid lawfare would be too tempting. Removing the Judiciary mirrors Yoo’s strat113. State v. Washington, 266 N.W.2d 597, 606 (Wis. 1978) (“The doctrine of separation of
powers must be viewed as a general principle to be applied to maintain the balance between the three
branches of government, to preserve their respective independence and integrity, and to prevent
concentration of unchecked power in the hands of any one branch.”).
114. Chadha v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 634 F.2d 408, 420 (9th Cir. 1980) (“Executive or legislative actions which contravene the principle of separation of powers are unconstitutional.”), aff’d, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
115. DAVID W. NEUBAUER & STEPHEN S. MEINHOLD, JUDICIAL PROCESS: LAW, COURTS, AND
POLITICS IN THE UNITED STATES 15 (3d ed. 2004). Essentially, the Judiciary differs from the Legislative and Executive Branches in four distinct ways. Id. First, the Legislative and Executive
Branches do not wait for others to bring problems to their attention; therefore, they are considered
the proactive branches of government. Id. Courts, however, are passive and reactive because they
depend on others to bring matters to their attention. Id. Second, the Legislative and Executive
Branches normally do not take an action that they do not have to take. Id. By avoiding politically
charged issues, the other branches of government deliberately let the Judiciary handle important
questions. Id. Third, the Legislative and Executive Branches are very responsive to elections, public
opinion, and partisan pressure. Id. Conversely, the federal Judiciary is largely insulated from the
broader political system due to lifetime appointments. Id. Fourth, the Legislative and Executive
Branches elicit a wide array of information from diverse points of view. Id. On the other hand, the
Judiciary receives information presented through the adversary process, which narrows and isolates
the evidence. Id.
116. Id.
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egy—interpret torture in a way that makes it unlikely that a civil suit or
prosecution would arise. Yoo’s strategy, however, was not grounded in
precedent.
The Judiciary’s traditional role in deciding the law117 was evident,
for example, when it ruled that the President acted outside the scope of
his constitutional authority118 and when it held that the Legislative and
Executive Branches, despite being in agreement, could not reallocate
their respective authorities.119 In the first example, the President of the
United States directed the Secretary of Commerce to take possession of
and operate most of the nation’s steel mills.120 The Court held that the
President’s order amounted to lawmaking, a legislative function, which
the Constitution had expressly confided to Congress and not the President.121 The President’s power to act must stem either from an act of
Congress or from the Constitution itself.122 In the second example, Congress enacted the Line Item Veto Act, which gave the President the power to “cancel in whole” three types of provisions that had been signed
into law.123 Although the Legislative and Executive Branches approved
this reallocation of power, the Court held that the Line Item Veto Act
was unconstitutional because it ignored the Presentment Clause124 of the
Constitution.125 The Court reasoned that, despite the agreement of the
branches, a textual provision of the Constitution could not be ignored.126
Thus, action outside the constitutional structure is unconstitutional.
By narrowly defining the law of torture so that any lawsuit would
become exceedingly unlikely to succeed in the courts, in effect, Yoo attempted to circumvent the Judiciary. The Judiciary, however, cannot be
considered removable merely because lawfare threatens its misuse. After
all, the Judiciary vindicates the injured and the accused. Moreover, the
Founding Fathers modeled our government so that one or two branches
could not control the government. Collusion between independent
branches of government “may justly be pronounced the very definition of

117. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (“It is emphatically the province
and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”).
118. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 589 (1952).
119. See Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 436–438 (1998).
120. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 343 U.S. at 582.
121. See id.
122. Id. at 585.
123. Clinton, 524 U.S. at 436.
124. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
125. Clinton, 524 U.S. at 440 (noting that the first President of the United States, George
Washington, wrote that the Presentment Clause requires that the President “approve all the parts of a
Bill, or reject it in toto”).
126. Id.
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tyranny.”127 Thus, regardless of whether the branches are in agreement or
in conflict, the principle is that all three branches must be involved in
questions of national security, specifically when it comes to torture.
B. Padilla Presented Purely Domestic Questions of Law
Padilla presented a question of domestic concern—whether, and to
what extent, a government lawyer should be held liable for his interpretation of law that he knows will be relied and acted upon by others. Unlike
a lawsuit filed by an alien, Padilla’s suit is one filed by an American citizen against an American lawyer who operated in a role to direct the
treatment of an American citizen on American soil. Concern that the Judiciary will become susceptible to lawfare tactics does not erase Padilla’s
potentially valid allegations and the potential constitutional protections to
which he is entitled as an American citizen.
Padilla is dissimilar to Arar v. Ashcroft, in which the court refused
to provide a civil remedy in the foreign policy context.128 In Arar, Maher
Arar filed an action against senior officials in the American government
and alleged abuse through harsh interrogation techniques.129 Unlike Padilla, Arar was not a citizen of the United States and was only temporarily on American soil. In 2002, Arar, a dual citizen of Canada and Syria,
was seized after he landed at Kennedy Airport in New York and, two
weeks later, through the practice of extraordinary rendition, was flown to
Syria, where he claimed he was held for ten months in a tiny cell and
beaten repeatedly with a metal cable.130
In 2006, Arar filed a civil suit against Ashcroft, Director of the FBI
Robert Mueller, senior immigration officials, and others in the Eastern
District of New York.131 Arar sought a Bivens132 remedy for the alleged
violation of his right to substantive due process. The Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit noted that this lawsuit presented questions touching on the role of the Executive Branch in combating terrorist forces with
international allies.133 The court then distinguished matters that go
beyond the borders of the United States—which necessarily affect the
127. Id. at 450 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 301 (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)).
128. Arar v. Ashcroft, 414 F. Supp. 2d 250, 252, 279 (E.D.N.Y. 2006), aff’d, 532 F.3d 157 (2d
Cir. 2008), vacated & superseded on reh’g en banc, 585 F.3d 559 (2d Cir. 2009).
129. Id. at 252.
130. Id. at 254–55.
131. Id. at 257.
132. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). A Bivens claim is an implied cause of action for damages against a federal official for violating the plaintiff’s constitutional
rights. Arar, 414 F. Supp. 2d at 267. It is the analog to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which permits civil actions
against state actors under color of law for violating a constitutional right. Id. at 265.
133. See Arar, 585 F.3d at 575 (noting that Arar’s complaint facially targeted the policy of
extraordinary rendition).
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country’s relationship with foreign countries—from matters that exist
solely within the boundaries of the Unites States.134 Because the success
in combating international terrorism requires coordination between the
law-enforcement and foreign-policy officials of foreign governments,135
the court held that three special factors counseled hesitation in awarding
civil damages under Arar’s Bivens claim.136 None of these factors is
present in Padilla.
First, unlike Arar, an alien, Padilla is an American citizen and
American citizens retain the right to challenge their detainment under the
writ of habeas corpus.137 In Arar, the court reasoned that Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution placed the regulation of aliens squarely within
the authority of the Legislative Branch.138 Because Congress had yet to
take any affirmative position on federal court review of extraordinary
renditions, Congress had not explicitly created a private cause of action
to plaintiffs in Arar’s position.139 Padilla, on the other hand, is an American citizen, and so the regulation of aliens is not applicable to his lawsuit. In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, the Supreme Court held that absent suspension of the writ, the writ of habeas corpus remains available to every individual detained within the United States.140 Therefore, a United States
citizen who is classified as an enemy combatant has due process rights to
receive notice of the factual basis of his classification and a fair opportunity to rebut the government’s factual assertions before a neutral decision-maker.141 Thus, because Padilla is an American citizen, he retains
the right to challenge his detainment and the right to bring a civil claim
for injuries that arise as a result of the detainment.
Second, unlike in Arar, where Arar was captured in the United
States and sent to Syria through extraordinary rendition, Padilla remained
on American soil under the control of American personnel during his
entire detention. Extraordinary rendition involves the exchange of diplomatic, security, and intelligence information between the intelligence
agencies of foreign countries.142 The potential for public exposure of
such classified information through lawfare tactics entails the risk that
other countries would become less willing to cooperate with the U.S. in
sharing intelligence resources to counter terrorism. But in Padilla, the
134. Arar, 414 F. Supp. 2d at 281.
135. Id.
136. Arar, 585 F.3d at 563.
137. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004).
138. Arar, 414 F. Supp. 2d at 281.
139. Id.
140. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 525.
141. Id. at 533.
142. Arar, 585 F.3d at 576.
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exchange of information between the United States and foreign countries
was limited to the investigation and surveillance of Padilla. Once Padilla
was apprehended, the United States’ need to exchange information with
foreign countries ceased. Additionally, Padilla did not allege that foreign-intelligence agents took part in any phase of his detention, further
diminishing potential foreign-policy tension between the United States
and foreign countries. In sum, the potential risk of exposing the involvement of foreign countries in a case of domestic lawfare was low, so the
likelihood that foreign countries would cease cooperating with the United States was also low.
The final and most important distinction between Arar and Padilla
is “the fundamental difference between courts evaluating the legitimacy
of actions taken by federal officials in the domestic arena and evaluating
the same conduct when taken in the international realm.”143 For instance,
a qualified-immunity claim in international terrorism cases, like Arar,
would offer inadequate protection because jurisprudence in the international realm is one where most domestic judges lack any special competence.144 On the other hand, in domestic terrorism cases like Padilla,
judges have constitutional authority to evaluate government officials’
decision-making in the domestic context.145 Additionally, judges also
have experience derived from living in the same environment as domestic officials.146 Courts, therefore, are properly set up to successfully adjudicate a terrorism lawsuit when the facts of the case involve substantially
domestic concerns, such as those presented in Padilla.
In sum, the issue presented in Padilla poses significant implications
pertaining to both the rights of American citizens and the actions of government lawyers who write legal memoranda. The issue presented in Padilla, furthermore, has a low probability of affecting the nation’s relationship with foreign allies. Finally, unlike international terrorism cases,
American judges in American courts are uniquely situated to successfully adjudicate criminal and civil claims that arise out of domestic terrorism. Thus, despite the potential misuse of the court system through lawfare tactics, the Judiciary properly accepted review of Padilla’s lawsuit.

143. Arar, 414 F. Supp. 2d at 282.
144. Id. In cases involving international terrorism, like Arar, almost all judges have neither the
international experience nor the background to adequately and competently balance the rights of an
individual against the needs of officials acting to “defend the sovereign interests of the United States,
especially in circumstances involving countries that do not accept our nation’s values or may be
assisting those out to destroy us.” Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
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C. Pursuant to Bivens, a Court May Have Reason to Extend
a Remedy Despite the Absence of a Statute
Had the Judiciary succumbed to the fear of lawfare, it would have
denied Padilla access to the courts and any potential remedy for valid
claims. A Bivens remedy, however, enables a court to cure a constitutional violation despite the absence of a statute conferring such a right.147
In determining whether a Bivens remedy exists, a court applies a twopronged test. First, the court determines whether an existing process
would adequately protect the plaintiff’s interest.148 Second, the court determines whether “any special factors counseling hesitation [exist] before
authorizing a new kind of federal litigation.”149
In Padilla, the court’s Bivens analysis underscores two conclusions.
First, without the Judiciary, it would be impossible for Padilla to seek a
remedy for his alleged injuries. Second, despite the importance of thwarting terrorism, nothing in Padilla supports the conclusion that courts
should defer adjudication of Padilla’s claim.
With regard to the first prong of the Bivens analysis, Padilla had no
other means of redress for the alleged injuries that he sustained during
his detention.150 Three reasons support this conclusion. First, the Military
Commissions Act of 2006, which authorizes trial by military commissions for violations of laws of war, only applies to alien, or noncitizen,
unlawful enemy combatants.151 Because Padilla is an American citizen,
the Military Commissions Act of 2006 could not apply to him. Second,
the other branches of government had not acted to provide an alternative
remedy for the type of constitutional violations alleged in this case.152
Thus, Padilla had no other judicial remedies to allege. And third, a habeas petition would not have provided an adequate, alternative remedy
because the habeas petition would have had to be filed against the military commander in charge of the brig where Padilla was confined, not
against Yoo.153
147. Id. at 267.
148. Padilla v. Yoo, 633 F. Supp. 2d 1005, 1020 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (quoting Wilkie v. Robbins,
551 U.S. 537, 537–38 (2007)).
149. Id. (quoting Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 378 (1983)).
150. Id.
151. Id. (citing 10 U.S.C. § 948r(c) (2006)).
152. Id. at 1020–21. In deciding that there were no other alternatives for Padilla to pursue, the
court relied on various newspaper articles criticizing the Obama Administration for not investigating
cases of alleged torture. Id. For example, “President Obama has shown little interest in prosecuting
officials of the previous administration, and it is not clear whether there will be a governmentsponsored investigation of Bush administration policies.” John Schwartz, Judge Weighs Dismissing
Case Involving Torture Memorandums, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/
03/07/us/07yoo.html.
153. Padilla, 633 F. Supp. 2d at 1021.
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Under the second prong of the Bivens analysis, “special factors
counseling hesitation ‘relate not to the merits of the particular remedy,
but to the question of who should decide whether such a remedy should
be provided.’”154 “[C]ourts should avoid creating a new, nonstatutory
remedy when doing so would be ‘plainly inconsistent’ with authority
constitutionally reserved for the political branches.”155 No special factors
counseled hesitation in Padilla for four reasons.
First, although Congress passed the Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF), which authorized the President to make enemy
combatant designations, Congress had not spoken, specifically or definitively, regarding the constitutional standard for the treatment of enemy
combatants.156 Relying on Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,157 the court in Padilla
noted that all three branches of the government have a role to play when
individual liberties are at stake and, further, there was no indication that
the Judiciary was precluded from review of Executive decisions made
pursuant to the AUMF.158 Because Congress did not explicitly exclude
the Judiciary, courts are not precluded from reviewing the treatment of
plaintiffs like Padilla.
Second, “a state of war is not a blank check for the President when
it comes to the rights of the Nation’s citizens.”159 Furthermore, “it does
not infringe on the core role of the military for the courts to exercise their
own time-honored and constitutionally mandated roles of review and
resolving claims like those presented” in Padilla.160 Granted, courts
should be cautious when intruding upon the judgment and discretion of
military authorities by targeting the government attorneys who advise
military leaders.161 And the Judiciary should defer to the Legislative and
Executive Branches of government with respect to the core strategic matters of war-making.162 Padilla’s allegations, however, “concern the possible constitutional trespass on a detained individual citizen’s liberties. . . .”163 The war power, therefore, “is a power to wage war successfully . . . [b]ut even the war power does not remove constitutional limita-

154. Id. at 1022 (quoting Sanches-Espinoza v. Reagan, 770 F.2d 202, 208 (D.C. Cir. 1985)).
155. Id. (quoting In re Iraq & Afg. Detainees Litig., 479 F. Supp. 2d 85, 103 (D.D.C. 2007)).
156. Id. at 1026.
157. 542 U.S. 531 (2004).
158. Padilla, 633 F. Supp. 2d at 1026 (“The joint resolution does not create a remedial scheme,
similar to the separate regime of military justice, or the elaborate remedial schemes set out, for instance, by the Social Security Act or the Civil Service Reform Act.”).
159. Id. at 1027–28 (quoting Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 536 (2004)).
160. Id. (quoting Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 536).
161. Id. at 1027.
162. Id. at 1028.
163. Id.
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tions safeguarding essential liberties.”164 Thus, the Commander in
Chief’s power is limited to creating war strategy, whereas it is within the
Judiciary’s power to safeguard constitutional liberties.
Third, Padilla does not threaten the revelation of government secrets. During the course of the Padilla case, all of the documents drafted
by Yoo, which were mentioned in the complaint, eventually became public record through Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests; thus,
there was little chance of revealing government secrets.165 In addition,
Yoo’s argument amounted to an assertion of the state-secrets privilege.
Should a privilege surface on behalf of the government, the Judiciary
could and would address those concerns in due time in order to manage
the case.166 And finally, while litigation may cause expenditure of valuable time and resources, litigation may be necessary to ensure that officials comply with the law.167
Lastly, as discussed in section B, Padilla’s claim involved American officials’ treatment of an American citizen within the country’s
boundaries. The treatment of an American citizen on American soil does
not raise the same specter of policy issues as does a case involving foreign relations.168
In sum, Padilla’s claims were rightly adjudicated by the Judiciary.
“[A] government of laws, and not of men”169 demands that the Judiciary
play a role in interpreting policy decisions that affect citizens of this
country. Additionally, the nation’s relationship with foreign governments
is not likely to be negatively affected in matters involving an American
government attorney and American citizens who are detained on American soil. Moreover, without the involvement of the Judiciary, plaintiffs
with potentially valid claims would be left without any remedy.
V. IN CASES LIKE PADILLA, IT IS APPROPRIATE TO DENY QUALIFIED
IMMUNITY FOR HIGH-RANKING GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS
With the role of the Judiciary properly established, the threat of
lawfare dissipates in light of the Judiciary’s adjudication of similar
claims against government attorneys. For instance, Padilla is not the only
case dealing with liability for high-ranking lawyers within the Bush Administration to come out of the Ninth Circuit in recent years. In September 2009, a three-judge panel of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir164. Id. (quoting Home Building & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 426 (1934)).
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 1030.
169. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803).
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cuit affirmed a district court ruling that denied former Attorney General
John Ashcroft’s motion to dismiss allegations that he misused the federal
material witness statute170 to unlawfully investigate and preemptively
detain Abdullah al-Kidd for suspected terrorist activities. While the court
in Padilla did not rely on al-Kidd,171 both cases evidence the Judiciary’s
role in balancing constitutional rights against the ability to effectively
advise the President and implement polices during the War on Terror.
Additionally, there is established precedent in denying qualified immunity to government attorneys who author unsound legal opinions.
A. Al-Kidd v. Ashcroft
On March 14, 2003, the Idaho U.S. Attorney’s Office submitted an
application to a magistrate judge seeking al-Kidd’s arrest as a material
witness in the trial of Sami Omar Al-Hussayen.172 Two days later, pursuant to the material witness warrant, United States agents arrested alKidd, a United States citizen, at Dulles International Airport.173 Over the
next sixteen days, he was confined in high-security cells—lit twenty-four
hours a day—in Virginia, Oklahoma, and Idaho.174 Because he was never
called as a witness in the Al-Hussayan trial or in any other criminal proceeding,175 al-Kidd alleged that he was arrested and confined because
Ashcroft promulgated policies to unlawfully use the federal material witness statute to investigate or preemptively detain terrorist suspects.176 In
response, Ashcroft claimed absolute immunity and, in the alternative,
qualified immunity.177
170. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(1) (2006) (“If, after a hearing . . . the judicial officers finds that no
condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required . . . such judicial officer shall order the detention of the person before trial.”).
171. Al-Kidd v. Ashcroft, 580 F.3d 949 (9th Cir. 2009).
172. Id. at 952. On February 13, 2003, a federal grand jury in Idaho indicted Al-Hussayan for
visa fraud and making false statements to U.S. officials. Id.
173. See id. at 951.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 954.
176. Id. at 952. Al-Kidd made three claims against Ashcroft. First, he alleged that Ashcroft was
responsible for a policy or practice under which the FBI sought material witness orders without
sufficient evidence that the witness’s testimony was material to another proceeding, or that it was
impracticable to secure the witness’s testimony. Id. at 957. Second, al-Kidd alleged that Ashcroft
designed and implemented a policy under which the FBI and DOJ would arrest individuals who may
have met the facial statutory requirements of § 3144, but with the ulterior and unconstitutional purpose of investigating or preemptively detaining them, in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Id.
Lastly, al-Kidd alleged that Ashcroft designed and implemented polices, or was aware of policies
and practices that he failed to correct, under which material witnesses were subjected to unreasonably punitive conditions of confinement, in violation of the Fifth Amendment. Id.
177. Id. Prosecutors are entitled to absolute immunity when they engage in activities “intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.” Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430
(1976). They are entitled to qualified immunity only when they perform investigatory functions,
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Qualified immunity seeks to achieve unique harmony between “two
important interests—the need to hold public officials accountable when
they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from
harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their duties reasonably.”178 To determine whether a government official is entitled to
qualified immunity, courts apply a two-prong approach. Courts ask
whether, taken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, the facts alleged show the officer’s conduct violated a constitutional
right, and if so, whether the right was clearly established in light of the
specific context of the case.179 For a constitutional right to be clearly established, its contours must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official
would understand that what he is doing violates that right.180 Direct, personal participation is not necessary to establish liability for a constitutional violation.181
Regarding the first prong, al-Kidd’s Fourth Amendment rights were
violated because he alleged specific facts showing that Ashcroft used the
material witness statute pretextually in order to investigate or preemptively detain suspects without probable cause.182 Regarding the second
prong, while no case had squarely confronted the issue of whether misuse of the material witness statute to investigate suspects violated the
Constitution,183 “officials can still be on notice that their conduct violates
established law even in novel factual circumstances.”184 This is so because “while there may be no published cases holding similar policies
[un]constitutional, this may be due more to the obviousness of the illegality than the novelty of the legal issue.”185

administrative functions, or are essentially functioning as police officers or detectives. Buckely v.
Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 273 (1993). The United States Attorney General is not entitled to absolute immunity in the performance of his “national security functions.” Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S.
511, 520 (1985).
178. Padilla v. Yoo, 633 F. Supp. 2d 1005, 1030 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (quoting Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808, 815 (2009)).
179. Al-Kidd, 580 F.3d at 964–65 (citing Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001)).
180. Id. at 964 (citing Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739 (2002)).
181. Id. at 965 (“Supervisors can be held liable for the actions of their subordinates for (1)
setting in motion a series of acts by others, or knowingly refusing to terminate a series of acts by
others, which they knew or reasonably should have known would cause others to inflict constitutional injury; (2) for culpable action or inaction in training, supervision, or control of subordinates; (3)
for acquiescence in the constitutional deprivation by subordinates, or (4) for conduct that shows a
‘reckless or callous indifference to the rights of others.’” (quoting Larez v. City of Los Angeles, 946
F.2d 630, 646 (9th Cir. 1991))).
182. See id. at 969.
183. Id. at 970.
184. Id. (quoting Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002)).
185. Id. (quoting Moreno v. Baca, 431 F.3d 633, 641 (9th Cir. 2005)).
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In al-Kidd’s case, no federal appellate court had held that the federal material witness statute satisfied the requirements of the Fourth
Amendment, but the definition of probable cause was clearly established.186 Existing case law emphasized that an investigatory programmatic purpose would invalidate a scheme of searches and seizures without probable cause. Ashcroft thus should have been on sufficient notice
that the material witness detentions, involving a far more severe seizure
than a mere traffic stop, would be similarly subject to an inquiry into
programmatic purpose.187 Therefore, al-Kidd’s right not to be arrested as
a material witness in order to be investigated or preemptively detained
was clearly established at the time of his arrest and Ashcroft was, accordingly, not entitled to qualified immunity.188
B. The Qualified-Immunity Analysis in Padilla v. Yoo
in Light of Previous Cases
While the War on Terror raised unprecedented legal questions, the
crux of the issue presented in Padilla was much narrower—whether, and
to what extent, a government lawyer should be held liable for his interpretation of law that he knows will be relied and acted upon by others.
Because American courts historically have answered qualified-immunity
issues, concerns of lawfare should not be a detriment to those courts
answering the same qualified-immunity issue presented in Padilla. In
determining the qualified-immunity question in Padilla, the trial court
did not consider the national-security context in which the case arose.189
Rather, the court focused on analyzing case law, including the jurisprudence from other circuits and district courts.190
Like the suits in al-Kidd and other cases, Padilla’s suit targeted an
individual who did not directly violate Padilla’s constitutional rights by
physically torturing him. Rather, Padilla alleged specific facts in his
complaint to satisfy the first prong of the qualified-immunity analysis—
that Yoo set in motion a series of events that resulted in the deprivation
of Padilla’s constitutional rights.191 Although Yoo was not the sole decision-maker or solely responsible for implementing detainee policy, he
186. Id. at 970–71.
187. Id. at 971.
188. Id. at 973.
189. Padilla v. Yoo, 633 F. Supp. 2d 1005, 1032 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (“[T]he fact that no case has
found a constitutional violation under the exact facts alleged does not imply that the law is not clearly established.”).
190. Id.
191. But cf. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1951 (2009) (holding that the “bare assertions”
alleged in the complaint amounted to nothing more than a “formulaic recitation of the elements” of a
constitutional discrimination claim).
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was highly influential in creating that policy because he researched and
interpreted national and international law as applied to Padilla. Like any
other government official, government lawyers like Yoo are responsible
for the foreseeable consequences of their conduct.192 For example, in
Lippoldt v. Cole,193 the court found an assistant city attorney liable where
she researched the law and drafted a letter denying a protest group’s application for a parade permit based on the content of the group’s
speech.194 Although senior city officials revised the letter, and others approved and eventually signed the denial of the permit, the court rejected
the theory that intervening factors cut off causation and instead found
that the drafting of a legal opinion justifying unconstitutional conduct
was “a substantial factor” in the decision to deny the parade permits and
violated the plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights.195
Despite the lack of a direct, physical connection to torturing Padilla,
Yoo violated Padilla’s constitutional rights in three ways. First, Yoo personally reviewed information pertaining to Padilla and determined that
Padilla was legally an enemy combatant.196 In addition, Attorney General
John Ashcroft relied on Yoo’s opinion in recommending to the President
that Padilla be taken into military custody.197 Finally, Yoo interpreted the
torture statute “to legally justify pressure techniques proposed by the
CIA, including waterboarding, mock burial, and open-handed slapping of
suspects.”198 Thus, because Padilla alleged specifically how Yoo proximately and forseeably violated Padilla’s rights, and did not make “bare
assertions” that merely recited elements of constitutional violations, Padilla’s complaint survived the first prong of the qualified-immunity analysis.
With respect to the second prong of the qualified-immunity analysis—whether Padilla’s rights were clearly established—the court held
that designation as an enemy combatant “does not automatically eviscerate all of the constitutional protections afforded to a citizen of the United States.”199 The court held that the basic facts alleged in the complaint

192. Padilla, 633 F. Supp. 2d at 1033.
193. Lippoldt v. Cole, 468 F.3d 1204 (10th Cir. 2006). Defendants did not raise a qualifiedimmunity defense on appeal; however, the principle that supports liability is applicable to Padilla.
194. See id. at 1210, 1220.
195. Id. at 1220.
196. Padilla, 633 F. Supp. 2d at 1014 (citing Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint ¶ 38).
197. Id. at 1033 (citing Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint ¶ 39).
198. Id. (citing Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint ¶ 28).
199. Id. See also, e.g., Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002) (“[O]fficials can still be on
notice that their conduct violates established law even in novel factual circumstances. . . .”); Phillips
v. Hust, 477 F.3d 1070, 1079–80 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that the fact that no case has found a constitutional violation under the exact facts alleged does not imply that the law is not clearly estab-
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clearly showed a violation of the rights afforded to citizens held in prison.200
Yoo argued that courts have never applied the level of constitutional rights sought in this action to this unique type of detainee.201 In a qualified-immunity analysis, however, the plaintiff need not establish that the
defendant’s behavior had been previously declared unconstitutional.202
Instead, “‘if binding authority indicates that the disputed right existed,
even if no case had specifically so declared, the [d]efendant[] would be
on notice of the right.’”203 For example, in Hope v. Pelzer, prison guards
hitched a prisoner to a post for an extended period of time in a position
that was painful, and under circumstances that were degrading and dangerous.204 According to the court, the fact that reasonable officers knew
that handcuffing a prisoner to a fence could constitute cruel and unusual
punishment should have provided defendants with some notice that
handcuffing a prisoner to a hitching post violated the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.205 Courts often refer to this line of reasoning as the “common sense” approach.206
While no court had previously afforded an enemy combatant the
kind of constitutional protections that Padilla sought, Padilla’s rights
were clearly established.207 Merely designating Padilla as an enemy
combatant does not remove his constitutional rights. Instead, the crucial
facts were that Padilla is an American citizen, sent from a civilian jail to
a military brig, detained without charge, deprived of contact with anyone, unable to practice his religion, and subjected to extreme interrogations.208 Moreover, under the “common sense” approach, Yoo, as an experienced government attorney, is imputed to have understood the fun-

lished); Giebel v. Sylvester, 244 F.3d 1182, 1189 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that a right can be clearly
established on the basis of common sense in the absence of precedent directly on point).
200. Padilla, 633 F. Supp. 2d at 1036 (“The complaint alleges that military agents entered a
civilian jail, seized a citizen from the civilian justice system, transported him to a military brig, detained him there indefinitely without criminal charge or conviction, deprived him of contact with
anyone, including attorneys or family, removed the basic ability to practice his religion, and subjected him to a program of extreme interrogations, sensory deprivation and punishment over a period
of three years and eight months.”).
201. Id.
202. Id. at 1037.
203. Id. (quoting Hydrick v. Hunter, 500 F.3d 978, 989 (9th Cir. 2007)).
204. Hope, 536 U.S. at 734–35 (noting that the prisoner was handcuffed to a hitching post in
the sun with no shirt for seven hours and was given one or two water breaks but not bathroom
breaks).
205. Id. at 745–46.
206. See Padilla, 633 F. Supp. 2d at 1036.
207. Id. at 1037.
208. Id. at 1036.
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damental civil rights afforded to every citizen under the U.S. Constitution.209
Even though the legal framework relating to the designation of a
citizen as an enemy combatant was developed around the same time as
the conduct alleged in the complaint took place, federal officials were
cognizant of the fundamental civil rights afforded to detainees under the
Constitution.210 Padilla properly alleged a violation of his constitutional
rights, which were clearly established at the time of the conduct. A reasonable federal officer should have believed the conduct was unlawful.211
Thus, despite the risk of lawfare in this lawsuit, the court correctly rejected Yoo’s qualified-immunity defense.
VI. CONCLUSION
The War on Terror raised unparalleled and extraordinary legal
questions, such as how to interpret the scope of national and international
law as applied to American citizens accused of supporting foreign terrorists. In writing the memoranda that defined torture policy, nationalsecurity lawyers, like Yoo, confronted two options. In the first option,
government attorneys could attempt to interpret the law to fit the War on
Terror, an untraditional war, into the framework of a traditional war,
where countries are openly hostile to each other and their soldiers wear
uniforms. Alternatively, the government attorneys had the option to attempt to prevent their interpretations of the law from ever ending up in
the court system.
Yoo chose the latter option. By interpreting the torture law narrowly, Yoo attempted to exclude the Judiciary from being involved in decision-making relating to enemy combatants, even if those enemy combatants are American citizens. Such an exclusion degrades the integrity of
our government’s structure.
Yoo, however, continues to support his policy of circumnavigating
the judiciary.212 After the killing of Osama bin Laden, Yoo stated that the

209. See id. at 1037.
210. Id. See also, e.g., Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103–04 (1976) (holding that denial of
medical attention may result in the infliction of unnecessary suffering which is “inconsistent with
contemporary standards of decency as manifested in modern legislation codifying the common law
view that it is but just that the public be required to care for the prisoner, who cannot by reason of
the deprivation of his liberty, care for himself”); Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 321–22 (1982)
(holding that “persons who have been involuntarily committed are entitled to more considerate
treatment and conditions of confinement than criminals whose conditions are designed to punish”).
211. Padilla, 633 F. Supp. 2d at 1038.
212. John Yoo, From Guantanamo to Abbottabad, WALL ST. J., May 4, 2011, http://online.wsj
.com/article/SB10001424052748703834804576301032595527372.html?mod=WSJ_Opinion_LEAD
Top.
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killing “vindicated the Bush administration.”213 Although he did not specifically refer to his memos, Yoo hinted that his strategy for conducting
interrogations on terrorism suspects, such as 9/11 mastermind Khalid
Sheikh Mohammed at Guantanamo Bay instead of prosecuting him in
Article III civilian courts, was responsible for the information that eventually led to the location of bin Laden.214
Lawfare is, indeed, a risk in our current litigious world. Often during the War on Terror, government agents hesitated to act without approval by government lawyers.215 Lawfare, however, will continue to be
a risk if attorneys misconstrue current law in a means-ends analysis. The
Judiciary correctly decided the case of Padilla v. Yoo despite the potential use of lawfare by the plaintiff. The Judiciary is a necessary and
integral part of a democratic government, including on matters that involve national security. The Judiciary’s importance is more pronounced
in matters solely involving domestic matters. If the Judiciary were circumvented, plaintiffs similarly situated to Padilla would be without legal
recourse. Further, in cases like Padilla, where a plaintiff establishes that
his rights were violated and the defendant government official knew of
those rights, the qualified-immunity defense should not be available.
Within the separation-of-powers framework, the Judiciary’s primary role is to interpret the law set in place by the Legislative and Executive Branches. While lawfare can be a tactic used by our enemies, it can
also be the tool through which the Judiciary reviews potentially overreaching Legislative and Executive implementations. During this review,
the Judiciary’s importance, especially in assessing constitutional protections of American citizens, is at its zenith, and it would be unconscionable if government officials were permitted to circumvent protections
provided by the court system.

213. Id.
214. Id. In April 2011, Attorney General Eric Holder announced that he would prosecute Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and four other 9/11 terror suspects in military trials. Alan Silverleib, Accused
9/11 Terror Suspects to Face Military Trials, CNN, Apr. 5, 2011, http://edition.cnn.com/2011
/US/04/04/guantanamo.tribunals/index.html#.
215. See GOLDSMITH, supra note 1, at 95. The CIA would forego a covert operation if it
thought that its personnel would be subject to retroactive discipline for acting outside the scope of a
vague legal memo. Id.

